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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
CARL JOHANSON AND CLARA J.
JOHANSON, His Wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal From Third District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable M. J. Bronson, Judge

Appellants' Brief on Respondent's
Petition for Rehearing
Respondent has filed a brief consisting'of 9·2 printed
pages in support of its petition for rehearing in this
cause. We shall not attempt to discuss all of the
matters referred to in that brief .

•Tustice Pratt has placed the right of the plaintiffs
to maintain this action upon the ground that the
statute secures a right in the insurance carrier to
recover a fixed amount of money, that is to say, the
amount of monry which the carrier has paid by way
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of compensation, and that such right comes into ex..
istence as a property right when the compensation
is paid; that this right, has its birth in property,
money or expenditure, and that the cause of action
whirh originally arose in tort hecomes s.ecurity
available to the insuranre carrier for the satisfacJ
tion of its right arising under the statute. This
language is used by .Justice Pratt in the conr~e 'lf
the opinion :
'' Th£:1' carrier's interests are measured by
the amount paid and not by the personal
relationship bPtween the parents and son,
which. jn the cause of artion for death,
governs the amount of dainages recovered.
The latter merely goes to the question of
the f:l'Xtent to which the carrier's interests
may ultimately be satisfied."
The conclusion is reached hv .Jus tire Pratt that thn
cause of action under Section 42-1-58, in favor of
the insurance carrier, may he as,signed. vVe understand the opinion of Ju~ticc> Pratt to hold that the
amount of the plaintiffs' recovery is to be limited
to the total amount of compensation paid by the
carrier to the plaintiffs.
Justice Wolfe concurs in the result reached by Justice Pratt. Justice Wolfe holds that the statute
effect~ an assignment of the cauge of action to the
Insurance carrier paying the con1pensation. That
the statute in effect make·s the cause of action
assignable, and being assignable, the caus·e· of action
may be reassigned by the insurance carrier to the
plaintiffs.. , It is undoubtedly true, as stated by
.Justice Wolfe, that there· is nothing whie;h prevents
the legislature from making assignable a cause of
action which was not assignable at common law and
which at common law did not survive. It, there·
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fore, beco·mes a question of the construction to be
given our ·statute in "'hich task we are not aided
materially by old rules at common law. We are not
certain whether the Justices concurring in the pre..
vailing opinion are agreed, however, that the plaintiffs must await the final payment of the full award
before this action can be n1aintained. If the statute
makes the cause of action assignable, whether it be
an action! upon a property right or an action arisi~g in tort for wrongful death, there would be no
~imitations except the general statute as to the time
when the action could be brought, unless by the
language of the statute, such limitation is imposed.
On the latter point, Justice Larson, in a dissenting
opinion, states that the employer or the carrier
need not wait until all of the payments are made before he or it commences action against the third
party. That might take years, when witnesses
would be unavailable, and perhaps limitation would
l1ave run. The- action may be brought any time when
.compensation has been awarded and paild. The
theory of Justice Larson is that the right to sue the
wrong-doing third party for n~gligenee has been,
by statute, vested solely in the one who pays compensation, and that the cause of action of the carriei
is one which enables it to recoup its losses oaused
by the negligent acts of the tort-fea"or. That the
maximum recovery by the carrier is the amount of
the compensation award n1ade by the commission
and which it is liable to pay; that the cause of action
is not assignable .

.T u~tice McDonoug1h holds that the right of recovery
by the insurance carrier iR measured by the mon:etary value of the decedent's life to the dependents ..
That this right was transferred bv operation ·of
1aw to the insnrance carrier upon the dependents'
r1ection to take compensation and the payment
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thereof. That the whole_of this_ ~ght and not part
of. it became th~ p:rope.rty of the insurance. carrier.
In other words, that the insurance carrier .or. employer upon payment of .compensation would become vested with the right to recover ·the full
pecuniary value of the deceased's lif.e as measured
iby the extent of contributions made by the deceased
to his dependents and other factors which are taken
into consideration as a matter of law in determining the value of a human life to those dama@ed. by
his death. Justice McDonough states that the statute recognizes this full recovery by the insurance
carrier because the statute requires the excess over
compensation payments to be paid to the dependents and that if the limit of the damages to be recovered were the amount of compensation paid
there could be no excess. Justice 1\fcDonough
further makes this pertinent observation in his con ..
struction of the statute:
''We must assume that the legislature in
providing for disposition o.f any excess
supposed that an amount in excess of the
compensation paid could under proper instructions upon the measure o.f dan1ages be
awarded. The damages, it seems clear,
which the plaintiff, subrogated to the rights
of the depende~ts, is entitled to recover,
are to he measured by the pernnifl,ry loss
caused the dependents hy the death of the
deeedent; that such i~ the measure of damr.g'es under our death statute."
Again Justice

~1cDonough

says:

''Clearly the cause of action sued on by the
insurance carrier is that which vested in
the dependents and the allegation showing
to the Court that the former has been subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rog-ated to the right to recover thereon
merely shows that he is the· proper party
plaintiff.''
We see in the decision of Justice l\1cDonough the
same expression of opinion expressed by J us.tice
\Volfe until we come to the question of the assignJ
ability of the cause of action by the insurance
earrier back to the dependents. Justice \Volfe, as
heretofore pointed out, takes the view, in which
naturally the appellant agrees, that the s.tatute, by
operation of law, effects an assignment of the
cause of action from the dependents to the insurJ
ance carrier which paid the compensation and the
cause of action thus having been made assignable
hy s1tatute it may be reas~igned by the insurance
carrier to the dependents. We feel sure that all of
the members of the Court will agree that there is
nothing, as Justice Wolfe points out, which preJ
vents the legislature from making assignable an
action which at common law was not assignable and
which did not surviy·e
Jn~tic>e

McDonough, ho,vever~ come~ to the eoncJuJ
sion that the cause of action does not' survive and is
therefore not assignable. This conclusion rest~
upon the decil"!ion in
National Union Fire Insurance Company
v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Conlpany, 44 Utah 26; 137 Pac. 653,
plus the further consideration that the ri~ht of
action under Section 42-1-58 is given to dependents
~.nd not the heirs or personal representatives as
provided in Section 104-3-11, and the fact tha:t the
earlier compensation statute provided that as a condition to reeeiving compensation·· the employee or
oependents Rh011ld assign any· cause of arfion existing agtainst the wrong doer to the· one liahle for
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the payment of compensation, and for this purpose
made the caus.e of action assignable ; that because
the legislature amended this section and provided
for subrogati_on, there arises some evidence of a
legislative intent to restrict the right of assign~
ment.
The case cited by Justice l\1cDonough, National
Union Fire Insurance Company v. Denver & Rio
Grande Railroad Company, supra, is authority that
the test of assignability is survival of the cause of
action; such is the law announced in that case. When
this cas.e wa.s decided, in 1913, we did not then have
a compensation law and the Court had no occasion
to conside~r a statute of the kind in question, by
which rights were recognized of the character set
forth in Section 42-1-58, and had no o:ccasion to consider the history of legislation which brought about
the enactment of compensation statutes., and particularly the rights of an employee or his dependents where injury or death had resulted in the
course of employment gro,,ring out of the wrongful
acts or negligence of a third 11erson.

I

Certainly the~ law has undergone important and
material changes by way of leglislation relating to
tlw fnregoing situation.
First, the legislature made the payment of
compensation the exclusive remedy;

Th0n, the law was amended so as to provide a remedy a.Q'ainst a wrong-doer cauHinQ' injury to or death of a person engaged
in his eipployment, and made the cam;e of
8ction assignable.
The purpose of the legislature was clear, at least
to the extent, that the wrong-doer should not escape
responsibility. Then the statute was again amend-

I
I
I,

I,
ll

I ii

I
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ed with a rather clear l~gislative intent, to make it
possible for the employer or insurance carrier in
the above situations to recover fr01n the wrong-doer
the amount paid as compensation, and the dependents, who had suffered a pecuniary loss far in
excess of the amount of compensation, to recover
such excess loss. To accomplish this purpose the
legislature said that the insurance carrier having
paid the compensation should be subrogated to the
rights of ~uch employee or his dependents to recover against such third person and that if a recovery should be made in excess of the amount of
the compensation awarded and paid then such excess, less the reasonable expense of the action,
should be paid to the employee or his dependents.
We do not thlnk the National Union Fire Insurance Company case, supra, should be regarded as
an authority to deny the dependents the benefits
evidently intended for their advantage by the foregoing statute. Justice ~IcDonoug:h recognizes such
intent when he says that it must be assumed that
the legislature in prnviding for disposition of any
excess supposed that an amount in excess of the
compensation paid could he awarded. Nor do we
think that because the legislature repealed the former statute providing for assignment to the insurance carrier and making the rause of ~tetion assign·~ hle evidences anv legislative intent that the benefits for negligent injury or wrongful ~eath should
no longer he ::~vajb ble to the dependents. On the
contrary, the statute still carried out the wholesome provision that sue h 'henefi ts were to be made
available to surviving dependents. Very logically,
and to meet the substantial equities, the l~gislature
hy a studied effort, has attempted from time to
time to make these benefits available for those who
were made to suffer by injury or death .due to
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wrongful. acts or negligence, and the writers are
thoroughly convinced that any construction which
would permit these benefits to he taken from the
dependents is, in view of our legislative history
upon this question, foreign to the clear and manifest purposes of the enactment of such legislation.
Any matters of uncertainty can be clarified by a
further opinion of the Court without the granting
of a petition for rehearing. The law as announced
jn the majority opinion permits the cause of action
to be assigned. If the decision stands as noiW written the plaintiffs and the court below should know
whether the full amount of compensation must be
paid before the [!,Ction can be maintained, and
whether or not in the meantime, the cause of action
is to become barred. Otherwise the court and a
5ury will consume valuable time and incur additional expense in· a determination of thi~ queRtion.

It is difficult for the writers to accept a construction of the statute which holds its meaning and
purport to be that the injured employee, or in the
event of his death, his dependents, are to he limited
in any recovery to the amount of compensation
awarded. In a suit by the in~ura.nee carrier it
would, of course, he a pure gratuit~T to permit a recovery of a greater amount than it has prud as
compensation, plus the expense inrident to a recovery of that amount. But certainly, it would not
h8 a gor~.tnHv to n0rmit fiT' employee f'r hiR dPnendJ
ents. to. recover the f11l} measure of nem1niarv loss,
which they have s.ustained. There is much difference between. an accident or death arising in industry and heca.nse of the emplovment. and an
accident or death resulting by the wrongful or
ne·gligent act of a third person, and try as we will,
we- cannot eom'prehend a ~onstruction which deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nies this added right for wrongful death or injury
for the benefit of persons made to suffer thereby.
When the legislature passed this sta~tute and said
that if compensation is awarded, the insurance
carrier should be subrogated to the rig·hts of such
employee or his dependents, and then carefully
provid€d that -if suclz recovery shalt be in excess of
the amount of the co·mpensation award, the excess,
iess the reasonable expense of the action should be
paid to the employee or his dependents, there was
something that the legislature had in rnind to provide as additional benefits by way of pecuniary loss
to those who had suffered the misfortune of such
injury or death. To such employee or dependents,
it is not a mere gratuity to provide for such
pecuniary loss.
There is a clear distinction between accidents arising in industry and necessarily incident thereto and
injury or death to one engaged in that industry
brought about by the wrongful act. or negligence of
a third person. Why would the legislature pass a
statute, which in cases of wrongful death or negligent injury, by its very terms, grant an additional
benefit to dependents unle~~ the legislature intend- .
ed that those persons should. be able to realize the
henefits of such statute. It would be a useless
thin()' t.o provide a benefit and g·hTe no re~m.edy by
which it might be enjoyed. It affords little help to
rPview rommon law action~ and e-nmmon law· pleadings, to interpret this sta.tut·e. We ought to look
at the intent of the leg-islature in passing- it. Undoubtedly it was to relieve against the o~d statute
which made assignment necessary before recovery
of compensation 'vith no attendant benefits to
those who suffer the loss.
Thr sta.tnte had as well been left as it was, if no
Roded benefit was to he given to those suffe'ring
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the damage. The legislature would readily recogillize the inequity of a rule which resulted in injury
to one and benefit to another, who had not suffered
injury. The equitable thing was done by this statute first, to restore to the emplo~er or insurance
carrier what it may have paid by way of compensation, and second, to secure additional benefits to
the injured employee or his dependents, and thereby to provide a full meas.ure of pecuniary loss.
'rhis removed and was intended to remove the common law restraint, as pointed out by Justice Wolfe,
on assignability of tort actions and effected a statutory as.stgnment of the cause of action ex delicito
from the dependents to the company which paid
the compensation, and thus the cause of action having been made assignable by statute, could legally
be re-assigned by the insurance carrier.
Res.pondent in its brief on petition for rehearing,
at page 27, sets forth its views why general assignability under the statute should not be permitted.
It admits that compensation acts are primarily for
the protection of those who labor and their dep~nrl
ents. It makes this statement and admission as
the foundation of its further argument. However.
it is further contended that neither the legislature
or a court qy judicial construction should ever
adopt any system that will encourage traffic . in
rigJhts prot~cted by the comnensation ac:t. It is said
that if the door is opened to a"~ii!Ilahilitv then
compensation benefits may be used for the nurposes of speculation in the outcome of personal injury suits ; that the doors should not. be openPd to
such an extent as to create opportunities for fraud
or lPqalized chicanery.
This argument is not easily understood when con. ~idered in relation to the e·ssential and outstandingreasons for the adoption of compensation acts.
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Such arg'Ulllent is more imaginary than real and
only tends to reopen personal viewpoints expressed
in the past by corporate interests that lawyers
frequently pressed 'unworthy causes arising out of
personal injuries and like chargJes by injured entployees and their counsel, that the corporate interests and their attorneys frequently withheld facts
and exercised economic preBsure upon employees to
avoid legitimate re0overies. It has been quite some
time since counsel has seen this type of argument
stressed and certainly it is an unusual argument in
view of present day social and economic readjustments. It may, of course, be admitted that one of
the reasons for the adoption of compensation acts
was to permit employees or dependents to recover
a non1inal amount of money without protracted
litig-ation but the securing of such compensation
was predicated entirely upon the theory that such
henefits should be so se0ured to employees injured
in the operation of that industry and not arising
ont of the wrongful or negligent acts of third
pPrsons.
Practically all con1pensation acts have now come
to recognize that the employees or their dependents, or the insurance carrier paying con1pensation
henefits Rhould be permitted to recover from third
rwrsons for injury or death arising in the course
of employment proximately caused by such wrongful acts or negligence. We have not before seen an
nrg-ument against such recovery predicated upon
the theory or suggestion that it would tend to create
opportunities for fraud or improper legal conduct.
It is most difficult to square this kind of argument
when viewed in the lig-ht of the facts in this case.
Here the deceased emplo~ee came to his dea.th as
the result of the grossest kind of ne~ligence on the
part of the defendant. Now hecause the dependSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ents and insurance carrier seek to recover for this
wrongful and negligent conduct, it is suggested
that such recovery should be denied beeause it
would give rise to fraud or legalized chicanery. As
we see it the statute was intended to reach situations of this very kind. When the wrong-doing defendant is requested to respond for the damage
caused and occasioned hy its. wrong or its neg1ligence it immediately attempts to shield itself by
urging the very technical defense in view of our
statute, of non-assignability.
\Ve again urge upon the Court a consideration of the
1nterest which by the statute is. gliven to the injured
employee or his dependents. Under the Utah statute any person who has a real interest in a controversy is a proper party p~aintiff. \V e think it must
be conceded that there was 'a clear intendment by
the express language of the statute to give added
benefits to the injured employee or to his dependents. If that is true then they become real parties
in interest. In
Section 1602, C. J., Title \Vorkman's Com-pensation Acts,
it is said that where under the Act the employee
or dependents of the deeeased employee have a
beneficial interest in the amount recoverable from
such person) if such amount is more than sufficient
inde1nnify the emplo~Ter or insurer, usually the
right of the employer o'r insurer who is entitled to
subrogation under the act is not exclusive and th£ernployee, or, in the case of the death of the em~lovee, the . dependents, or the p·ersonal· representtittl-Ve of the- employee, may sue as a real party in
interest.
~r~t :•;
' ,;~~ .

to

No opinion was expressed by any of the Justices
aR to the effe-ct of the waiver which forms part of
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the assignment of the insurance carrier to the
plaintiffs. \V e again call the Court's attention to
the holding of some of the cases cited in
Section 1603 U. J ., Title Workman's Compensation Acts,
to the effect that the benefit of or rights acquired
under provisions of the general type here considered may be waived by the employer or insurer or
lost by estoppel and if by an ag~reement between
the employer and the employee the right 1to bring
an action against the tort-feaso•r is left with the
employee the tort-feasor ma.y not complain.
In this case no one complains about the right of
the plaintiffs to maintain this action to recover
additional benefits except the wrong-doer itself,
the person responsible for the death. Furthermore, there is ample authority for the proposition
tp.at the statute, which by clear intendment attempts to confer these benefits on the injured employee or dependents, should be liberally construed to effeet the beneficial purposes intended
and to prevent a failure of remedy. Some of the
cases hold that on failure of the employer or insurer to bring action then the right of ac.tion passes
to the employee, and the employee, or in case of· his
death, the personal representative, 1nay prosecute
the action in his own name, the employer retaining
only an interest in the proceeds to the extent of his
compensation payments. The language of the
compensation acts differ materially but they are
all aimed at the same purpose, towit, to permit the
recovery of additional benefits by the employee or
his dependents against the person responsible for
injury or death by wrongful act or negligence.
We have not attempted to analyze all of thP- statutory provisions, but have examined the' N ebra~l\:a
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statute as it ex~sted at the time of the Nebraska decision hereinafter referred to. The statute was as
follorws:
'' r11he employer shall be subrogated to the

right of the employee or to the dependents
against such third person, and the recovery by such employer shall not be limited to the amorunt ~payable as compensation to such employee or dependents, but
such employer may recover any amount
which such employee or his dependents
·would have been entitled to recover. Any
recovery by the employer against such
third person in e·xcess of the compensation
pa1 d by the employer after deducting the
expenses of making such recovery, shall
he paid forthwith to the employee or to the
dependents and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer, on account
of any future installments of compelJ~Rtion. ''
In the Nebraska case of
Thomas v. Otis Elevator Company, 172

N. W. 53,
the Supreme Court of that Statf~ held that the statute djd not take away the right of the employee to
re1cover damages against a third person when thA
relation of master and servant does not exist; that
the seetiorn was designed for the protection of an
employer who had paid compensation, and that if
the employer's rights were protected, it wa.s no
concern of the _negligent third party.
In the case of
0 'Donnel1 v. ·Baker Ice Machinery Company, (Neb.), 205 N. W. 5fH.
the Court held that the right to bring an action
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against the third party rests with the employer
only until such time as· the employee can allege and
prove that his employer has negiected and refused
to institute the action, and that the employer is
subrogated to the position of the plaintiff (employee) and in case the employer, after having
settled with the employee under the Workman'~
Compensation Act, refus·es to proceed and washes
its hands of the whole procedure, then plaintiff
~hould not be prevented from proceeding under the
provisions of the Act as was done in that ca..~e.
To the same effect i~
Murphy Conlpany v. Serck, 177 N. W. 747.
In a Minnes·ota case,
:l\1cGuigan v. Allen, 206 N. W. 714,
the Court arrived at the following
conclusion:
( 1) The right of action under the death
statute is not taken away but may be exercised by the personal representative for
thP benefit of the dependents, notwithstanding the fact that the employer can
hr compel1ed to make or has made compensation.

( 2) That if such action is brougilit and
judgment obtained and collected or a RettlP.mfmt is made, the net amount received is to
l"P credited upon the or deducted from the
fl()mpensation payable by the employer.
(3) If the compensation is paid, the employer becomes subrogated to the rights
of the employee or his dependents as
rwainst the third party, and if the recovery exceeds the compensation paid, the
rxcN~s belongs to the employee or his deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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pendents after deducting certain expenses
1nentioned in the statute.
In the c~se of
City of Redwing v. Eichinger, 303 N. W.
622,
it is s~aid by the Court that a statutory subrogation
has the same characteristics as if it were -a creature
of equity. It is enforced only for the purpose of
accomplishing the ends of justice.
Respectfully submitted.

A. H. HOUGAARD,
E. LEROY SHIELDS
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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